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INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM, NEGATIVITY BIAS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION USE BY 
POLITICIANS: A SURVEY EXPERIMENT. 
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ABSTRACT 
New Public Management popularized performance measurement in public organizations. Underlying 
performance measurement’s popularity, is the assumption that it injects performance information (PI) 
into decision-making thus rationalizing the ensuing decisions. Despite its popularity, performance 
measurement is criticized. In part, this criticism results from the limited knowledge of the conditions 
under which PI is purposefully used by politicians. We conduct a survey experiment based on real PI 
with 1,240 politicians. We hypothesize that PI has a positive impact on performance information use 
(PIU) when PI is benchmarked with coercive, mimetic or normative pressures. Moreover, due to 
negativity bias we expect this positive impact to be stronger when PI signals low performance. We find 
that normative pressures have a positive impact on actual PIU while coercive pressures positively affect 
intended PIU. Negativity bias is only relevant when linked to coercive pressures and intended PIU for 
analyzing the organization’s finances. 
KEYWORDS 
Performance measurement, accounting information, institutional isomorphism, negativity bias, 
performance information use.
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INTRODUCTION 
The advent of New Public Management (NPM) – a focus on accountability, effectiveness and efficiency 
– has ignited the popularity of performance measurement in public organizations (Hood, 1991; 
Osborne, 2006). Performance measurement has been conceptualized as an approach to strategy 
implementation which includes (a) using performance information to track the realization of strategic 
goals over time, (b) setting targets for this information and evaluating performance against those 
targets and (c) comparing performance information across departments and with other organizations 
(George & Desmidt, 2018; Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013). Underlying its popularity, is the 
assumption that performance measurement “works”. Using performance information is assumed to 
contribute to public service performance because it increases accountability and provides information 
to rationalize decision-making (Hatry, 2007; OECD, 1994, 1997). Following this assumption, 
policymakers worldwide have seen the benefits of performance measurement and approved 
legislative initiatives to coerce performance measurement to governments at all levels. Examples 
include the Government Performance and Results Act in the US, Best Value in the UK, and the Policy 
and Management Cycle in Flanders (Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law, & Walker, 2002; George, Desmidt, & 
De Moyer, 2016; Kravchuk & Schack, 1996). 
At first blush, the argument favoring performance measurement seems intuitively agreeable. 
After the implosion of the unsustainable, oversized, bureaucratic and procedural government of the 
Weberian Bureaucracy, there was a need for a parsimonious approach to resource allocation as well 
as a focus on output and results in public organizations – the policies of Reagan and Thatcher during 
the eighties are often cited as examples of policymakers addressing this need (Hood, 1991; Hughes, 
2012). However, times have changed. Some of the assumptions underlying NPM have been challenged 
by the New Public Governance-movement due to NPM’s focus on control and blame – as opposed to 
trust and cooperation (Koppenjan, 2012; Osborne, 2006). Similarly, performance measurement 
received strong criticism and was found to result in blame games by public sector practitioners (Hood, 
2011; Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015; Radin, 2006). A paradox thus emerges. On the one hand, 
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performance measurement is widely used by public organizations in the belief that it enhances 
accountability, decision-making and, ultimately, public service performance. On the other hand, 
criticism on its actual effectiveness in the public sector has never been more potent. 
Underlying this paradox is a lack of understanding of the conditions under which performance 
information is actually being used by public sector practitioners (Moynihan & Pandey, 2010). Several 
studies have linked performance measurement directly to public service performance (e.g. Gerrish, 
2016; Poister et al., 2013) – thus implicitly assuming that when performance measurement systems 
are in place, the ensuing performance information is also being used. However, this is clearly not the 
case as psychological, political and technical factors have influenced performance information use 
even when performance measurement systems are in place (e.g. Nomm & Randma-Liiv, 2012; Taylor, 
2011). Moreover, performance measurement has predominantly been conceptualized at the 
organizational, meso-level using survey data from administrative staff (e.g. George & Desmidt, 2018; 
Pollanen, Abdel-Maksoud, Elbanna, & Mahama, 2016), which inhibits our ability to elucidate the 
conditions under which performance information is used by individuals, at the micro-level, and 
particularly by politicians. This is no trivial matter as policymaking in many public organizations is part 
of the political arena where individual politicians use information – often provided by administrative 
staff – as well as their own political beliefs and agreements to formulate new policies and decisions 
related to those policies (George, Desmidt, Nielsen, & Baekgaard, 2017; Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015). 
One could thus argue that performance measurement is particularly effective in public organizations 
when politicians purposefully use performance information to inform their evaluation and learning 
processes (Kroll, 2015). Indeed, some studies have focused on the purposes and – to some extent – 
the conditions under which politicians use performance information (e.g. Askim, 2009; Ter Bogt, 2004). 
However, these studies do not touch upon whether and how the content of performance information 
matters to the extent to which this information is actually used by politicians (Kroll, 2015). 
To expand our understanding of whether and how the content of performance information 
matters, we use theory on institutional isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) to hypothesize that 
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performance information is used more when it is benchmarked with either a coercive, normative or 
mimetic institutional pressure. Additionally, we draw on literature on negativity bias – in particular 
negative differentiation theory (Rozin & Royzman, 2001) – to hypothesize that the impact of 
institutional pressures on performance information use is stronger when performance information 
signals low performance. We conduct a randomized survey experiment with 1,240 local politicians 
from Flemish municipalities (Flanders is the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) to test these 
hypotheses. This setting is particularly relevant due to recent NPM-like reforms that have enforced 
elements of performance measurement upon Flemish municipalities (George et al., 2016). In this 
experiment, real performance information of a municipality is used, namely an indicator that measures 
the financial performance of Flemish municipalities (i.e. the Self-Financing Margin). Our dependent 
variables include different measures of intended purposeful use of the Self-Financing Margin as well a 
semi-behavioral measure of actual purposeful use. Purposeful use implies that the indicator is used as 
an analysis instrument, to evaluate or learn more about the municipality’s performance (Kroll, 2015). 
Our study is original and distinctive from earlier research in six specific ways. First, we address 
the call for more insights into the conditions under which practitioners purposefully use performance 
information in public organizations (Kroll, 2015; Moynihan & Pandey, 2010). Second, by focusing on 
local politicians we expand the current focus on managers and managerial rationality to politicians and 
political rationality in explaining performance information use (Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015). Third, by 
employing a randomized survey experiment based on real information we build on state-of-the-art 
methods for identifying causal inference that do not suffer from endogeneity issues, which is a 
weakness of much current public administration research (George & Pandey, 2017). Fourth, we 
extrapolate insights from institutional isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) – a well-established 
theory within the social sciences – towards performance measurement research by identifying 
whether coercive, normative and mimetic pressures help explain the conditions under which 
politicians purposefully use performance information. Fifth, we incorporate negativity bias (Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001) as a moderator based on psychological theory thus using theories and methods from 
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psychology to elucidate public administration phenomena (i.e. Behavioral Public Administration) 
(Grimmelikhuijsen, Jilke, Olsen, & Tummers, 2017). Finally, our insights can help practitioners evolve 
from performance measurement (i.e. generating performance information) toward performance 
management (i.e. performance information is not only generated but also purposefully used) (Julnes 
& Holzer, 2001). 
The main contribution and take-home argument of our paper lies in the realization that 
performance measurement and management in the New Public Governance era are influenced by 
institutional forces coming from the organization’s network (Koppenjan, 2012; Osborne, 2006). 
Indeed, we uncover that when performance information is benchmarked with a performance standard 
set by a central authority, politicians are more likely to use said information when analyzing municipal 
finances and overall performance. Similarly, politicians are more likely to ask for more information on 
their performance when performance information is benchmarked with a norm advised by a 
professional organization. Whether or not said information is positive or negative seemingly matters 
less although we do uncover some evidence for both blame avoidance and credit claiming by 
politicians. Hence, to move from performance measurement to management in the New Public 
Governance era, we cannot neglect the institutional forces that shape public organizations and actors 
within. 
We do, however, need to acknowledge that although coercive and normative pressures had a 
part to play – our findings were mostly significant at the p < .10 level and mimetic pressures proved to 
be irrelevant. In part, these findings are the result of our specific empirical setting and we thus urge 
caution towards a broad generalization of both our significant and insignificant findings. Indeed, 
further research is needed to assess the impact of institutional isomorphism on performance 
measurement and management. Moreover, other research found that contingency theory better 
predicts management tool usage in the public sector than institutional isomorphism (e.g. Lægreid et 
al., 2007) and our relatively modest results do not provide enough evidence to counterbalance these 
insights. Nonetheless, we follow other scholars by concluding that institutional forces cannot simply 
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be neglected in research on performance measurement and management in the public sector (e.g. 
Ashworth et al., 2009). 
Conclusively, this paper has implications for public administration practice by illustrating that 
performance dashboards or reports should contain relevant institutional benchmarks (i.e. 
performance standards set by central authorities or adviced standards set by professional 
organizations) to enhance purposeful usage of this information by politicians. Simply raining down 
numbers is not enough. Our implications for public administration theory lie in our identified need for 
a more nuanced approach to the performance measurement debate, which acknowledges the role of 
institutional, macro-level forces as well as micro-level behavior and attitudes as opposed to only 
analyzing the meso-level of the public organization. In what follows, we elaborate on our theoretical 
frameworks and define our hypotheses. Next, we discuss the design of our experiment – including 
balance and manipulation checks – as well as our empirical setting. We move on to our results and 
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for practice and theory. 
Institutional isomorphism and performance information use 
In order to study how the content of performance information matters to performance information 
use, we turn to theory on institutional isomorphism. While previous public administration studies on 
performance information use by individuals have often turned to psychological theory due to its focus 
on explaining individual behavior (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017), we argue that studying institional 
isomorphism helps unravel the broader contextual – as opposed to individual – conditions that 
influence individuals’ performance information use. Institutional isomorphism is one of the theoretical 
mechanisms underlying New Institutional Theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008) and is 
particularly useful to investigate public sector adoption of administrative innovations (Ashworth, 
Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009; George & Desmidt, 2014; Lowndes & Wilson, 2003). One of the core 
assumptions of New Institutional Theory is that specific institutions formulate rules that need to be 
followed by individuals if they seek to obtain legitimacy (Lowndes & Wilson, 2003; Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991). Public sector practitioners thus operate in “an environment dominated by roles, requirements, 
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understandings, and assumptions, beliefs and scripts about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable 
organizational forms and behavior” (Decramer, Smolders, Vanderstraeten, & Christiaens, 2012, p. 
S90). As a result of this environment, institutional isomorphism emerges – which “is a constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 66). 
Institutional isomorphism occurs as a result of three specific institutional pressures: coercive 
(i.e. indicating conformity with formal and informal rules and regulations), mimetic (i.e. common 
responses to uncertainty based on modelling after other organizations) and normative (i.e. through 
formal education and advice from professional organizations) pressures (Decramer et al., 2012; George 
& Desmidt, 2014; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Hence, applied to the context of performance information 
use, we can expect actors within public organizations (i.e. politicians) to use performance information 
when it is benchmarked with a coercive, mimetic or normative pressure, even if technically inefficient, 
in order to gain legitimacy, and the resources necessary to ensure their “survival” (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Zucker, 1987). 
Coercive pressures in the form of formal regulations have clearly emerged in the context of 
performance measurement in public organizations. Legislative initiatives such as the Government 
Performance and Results Act in the US and Best Value in the UK coerced public organizations to 
formulate, implement and report on performance information to some form of central authority as 
well as achieve specific performance standards (Barkdoll & Bosin, 1997; Boyne et al., 2002). In the 
empirical setting of this paper (i.e. Flemish municipalities), several rules and regulations have also been 
formulated by the Flemish Government and a specific performance standard was set concerning the 
financial performance (i.e. Self-Financing Margin) of Flemish municipalities (Goeminne & George, 
Forthcoming). Hence, extrapolating the insights from institutional isomorphism, we expect that 
politicians who receive performance information that is benchmarked with this coercive performance 
standard set by the Flemish Government are more likely to use this performance information to ensure 
their legitimacy as politicians. This results in following hypothesis: 
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H1: PI benchmarked with a coercive pressure is positively related to PIU by politicians. 
Mimetic pressures indicate that “organizations may model themselves on other organizations” 
when confronted with uncertainty (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 69). Applied to performance 
measurement in public organizations, we can expect public sector practitioners to actively look at what 
their neighbors are doing and use this information in their evaluation and learning processes. Indeed, 
public sector evidence has shown that public organizations are influenced by the behavior of sister 
agencies in choosing to adopt specific performance management processes (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2009; 
Berry, 1994; Berry & Wechsler, 1995). In Flemish municipalities, mimetic behavior can also be expected 
as recent NPM-reforms have created uncertainty among politicians and administrative staff on how to 
apply the coerced performance measurement system and achieve performance standards (George & 
Desmidt, 2014). As such, taking into account the mechanisms underlying institutional isomorphism, 
we expect that politicians who are confronted with performance information benchmarked with the 
average score of their neighboring municipalities are more likely to use this information in their quest 
to minimize uncertainty in the current reform setting. This results in our second hypothesis: 
H2: PI benchmarked with a mimetic pressure is positively related to PIU by politicians. 
 Normative pressures emerge “primarily from professionalization”, which is defined as “the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work 
[…] and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991, p. 70). Professional organizations are a specific example of a normative pressure that 
is especially relevant to public organizations. Indeed, the public sector is typically filled with 
professional organizations that group a set of public organizations (e.g. National League of Cities in the 
US) or a set of public sector professions (e.g. Association of City Managers in the Netherlands). Based 
on institutional isomorphism, one can expect these organizations to impact the activities of their 
members (e.g. Blair & Janousek, 2014; Stillman, 1977). Again applied to our empirical setting, Flemish 
municipalities are grouped by the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities – which offers advice 
and support to all its members. In line with institutional isomorphism, we thus expect that politicians 
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who are confronted with performance information benchmarked with a norm advised by the 
Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities are more likely to use this performance information as 
an indication of their professionalization as politicians. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: PI benchmarked with a normative pressure is positively related to PIU by politicians. 
The moderating role of negativity bias 
Negativity bias  is a theoretical concept from psychology which indicates that human beings in general 
tend to react more strongly to negative events, experiences or information than to positive or neutral 
ones – even when all other factors are kept constant (Baumeister, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001). The opposite of negativity bias, is positivity bias – which argues that positive events, 
experiences or information spark a stronger reaction (Ferrara & Yang, 2015). Both biases have been 
empirically tested in psychology literature, with negativity bias emerging, for instance, in social 
judgements of other people (Baumeister et al., 2001) and positivity bias emerging, for instance, in the 
impact of Twitter messages (Ferrara & Yang, 2015). Research in public policy and administration has 
typically centered on negativity bias due to its clear link with some undesired consequences of New 
Public Management – including “naming and shaming” as well as “blame games” based on negative 
performance information (Hood, 2011). Nonetheless, finding evidence on positivity bias might imply 
that performance measurement in public organizations is not only about naming, shaming and 
blaming, but perhaps also about credit claiming. 
Within public policy and administration studies, negativity bias has typically been used to argue 
that negative information is more attention-grabbing than positive information, or that fear of costs 
often outweigh anticipation of benefits. A variety of public policy and administration studies have 
emerged which validate the central proposition of negativity bias. For instance, low performance of 
public organizations is argued to spark strong attention from the public whereas high performance 
often stays under the radar (Hood, 2011; James & Moseley, 2014; Lau, 1982) – which implies that 
politicians tend to focus more on low performance because this could damage their re-election 
(Soroka, 2006). Nielsen and Baekgaard (2015, p. 551) frame this negativity bias in relation to 
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performance information by indicating that “credit claiming [is] of much less importance than blame 
avoidance” and illustrate the impact of negativity bias on politicians’ attitudes to spending and reform. 
Moreover, their findings are successfully replicated by George et al. (2017) with Flemish local 
politicians. Similarly, Nielsen and Moynihan (2017) find that politicians are more likely to attribute 
responsibility for performance data to administrators but only when low performance information is 
given. Hence, both in theory and based on public policy and administration evidence, negativity bias 
seemingly matters when assessing the impact of performance information. 
 Importantly, the previously cited studies typically focus on policy or management preferences 
resulting from negative information – not on actual usage of said information. Nonetheless, we argue 
that negativity bias might also be applicable to performance information use due to the concept of 
negative differentiation theory (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Negative information does not only result in 
more attention and/or more fear of costs – it also results in more information-processing by 
individuals. Negative differentiation theory argues that people tend to spend more time processing 
negative information than positive (Abele, 1985). Performance information use is – in its essence – an 
information-processing activity where bounded rationality implies that one needs to make choices on 
which information to gather and use. Applied to the institutional pressures - performance information 
use relation, we argue that the institutional pressures have a stronger impact under negative 
conditions than positive because politicians are inclined to spend more time processing negative 
information. This leads us to our final hypothesis: 
H4: The positive relation between PI benchmarked with an institutional pressure and PIU by 
politicians is stronger when PI signals low performance. 
METHODS 
Empirical context  
The case of politicians in Flemish local government is particularly relevant from a New Institutional and 
methodological viewpoint and hence constitutes our empirical case. First, recent legislation by the 
Flemish Government has imposed a performance management cycle as well as a performance 
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standard (i.e. Self-Financing Margin) upon Flemish local governments with the aim of improving their 
financial performance (George et al., 2016). This legislation ensures that we can use actual 
performance information related to financial performance (i.e. Self-Financing Margin). Moreover, our 
defined institutional benchmarks are real as (a) performance standards have been set by the Flemish 
Government, (b) an uncertainty on how to address the reforms is present thus stimulating mimetic 
behavior and (c) professional organizations are offering their advice on how to answer uncertainties 
(George & Desmidt, 2014). 
Second, Flemish municipalities have a similar institutional and economic context, which allows 
us to exclude several otherwise confounding variables (Goeminne & Smolders, 2014). Conclusively, by 
surveying actual local politicians in a homogeneous institutional and economic setting, using real 
performance information and linking this information to actual institutional pressures, we greatly 
enhance the realism underlying our survey experiment – which is a common criticism of these types 
of experiments (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; Margetts, 2011). 
Data collection 
In order to draw valid conclusions, a randomized survey experiment was sent to actual city councilors 
of all 308 Flemish municipalities. When designing the survey experiment, we took into account the 
recent recommendations of Baekgaard et al. (2015). Specifically, our survey needed to be up to par 
with the general survey requirements set for public administration scholarship (Lee, Benoit-Bryan, & 
Johnson, 2012; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). These requirements include: (a) pretesting 
the survey, (b) identifying expert informants, (c) offering an incentive (i.e. policy report) to ensure 
committed respondents, (d) adding labels to response options and highlighting different items, (e) 
putting the experimental treatment and the dependent variables on different pages of the survey to 
create psychological separation, (f) guaranteeing anonymity, (g) surveying the entire population to 
avoid issues with sample frames and (h) including a general statement in our invitation letter to 
minimize response bias. The survey was sent to the entire population of 7,290 city councilors beginning 
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of February 2017. Three reminders were sent and, after three weeks, we had received 1,240 responses 
corresponding to a response rate of 17 per cent. 
Randomization procedure and estimation method 
In order to trace the causal effects of our experimental treatments, respondents were randomly 
assigned to either a control group or one of three treatment groups by the software package we used 
(i.e. Qualtrics). However, within each of the four experimental groups respondents received different 
information depending on the financial performance (i.e. Self-Financing Margin) of their municipality 
and the average financial performance of their neighboring municipalities. Thus, we randomly assign 
respondents to different institutional pressures, but do not manipulate the signal of the information 
(i.e. the financial performance disclosed). The survey design is presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Finally, all respondents across the groups were asked the same questions about performance 
information use (i.e. our dependent variables) as well as some manipulation checks right after the 
experimental treatments. 
Our approach resembles that of previous studies (e.g. George et al., 2017; Nielsen & 
Baekgaard, 2015; Nielsen & Moynihan, 2017) in which the actual content of information was not 
manipulated due to ethical concerns about the detrimental effects of deceiving political decision-
makers. However, the randomization procedure ensures that the groups are alike on average in terms 
of the actual content of the information, and the causal effects of the treatments can thus be identified 
by simply comparing performance information use across experimental groups.  
Independent variables 
Our independent variables aim to measure a benchmark with a coercive, mimetic or normative 
institutional pressure. First, we need to select a relevant performance indicator to benchmark. We 
focus on the Self-Financing Margin of each municipality. The Self-Financing Margin evaluates the long 
term financial stability of a municipality and is calculated by subtracting the exploitation expenditures 
from the exploitation income, and thereafter subtracting the loan charges which consist of capital 
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repayments and interest from outstanding loans. A positive Self-Financing Margin indicates that the 
municipality is, in the long run, able to generate sufficient resources from the normal exploitation to 
cover the charges of taking up a loan. It signals that a municipality is able to make investments without 
having to take on another loan or invoke additional loan charges (Goeminne & George, Forthcoming). 
Following the Local Government Decree, Flemish local governments are obliged by the Flemish 
Government to make sure that their Self-Financing Margin at least equals zero in the final year of their 
ongoing policy cycle. The data of the Self-Financing Margin are gathered from the annual account of 
each municipality, which can be publicly consulted via the website of the Flemish government’s Agency 
for Home Affairs (http://lokaalbestuur.vlaanderen.be/bbc/data-bbc). 
 Next, we identify whether the Self-Financing Margin of each municipality is (a) below or above 
the standard set by the Flemish Government (i.e. at least 0), (b) above or below the average of the 
neighboring municipalities (i.e. we calculated this as the unweighted average of the Self-Financing 
Margin of all border-sharing municipalities) and (c) above or below the norm advised by the 
Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (i.e. which is also at least 0).The actual Self-Financing 
Margin is presented in the vignettes. For the first treatment group, the coercive benchmark was added, 
for the second treatment group the mimetic benchmark was added and for the third treatment group 
the normative benchmark was added. This resulted in the vignettes presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Dependent variables 
Our dependent variables seek to grasp the extent to which politicians intend to purposefully use our 
specific performance indicator (i.e. the Self-Financing Margin) to evaluate or learn more about the 
municipality’s performance. Importantly, we argue that this usage can differ based on the actual 
assessment that needs to be made by a politician. Financial indicators might be more fitting to assess 
the municipal finances whereas indicators concerning citizen satisfaction might be more fiting to assess 
the quality of municipal service delivery. We incorporate this nuance by – after our vignettes – 
including three different statements on performance information use: (1) I will use the Self-Financing 
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Margin when analyzing the financial situation of my municipality, (2) I will use the Self-Financing 
Margin when analyzing the overall performance of my municipality and (3) I will use the Self-Financing 
Margin when analyzing the quality of service delivery in my municipality. All variables were assessed 
on a scale from 0 to 10. Additionally, we include a semi-behavioral construct to measure actual 
purposeful use of performance information. Namely, we asked our respondents to fill out their e-mail 
if they want to learn more about the Self-Financing Margin of their municipality (which is a 
dichotomous variable, 0 = no email and 1 = email given) – by filling this out, we argue that politicians 
illustrate behavior geared towards purposefully using this specific performance indicator (Kroll, 2015). 
 Table 2 indicates the descriptives of our study. As is apparent, the random assignment of 
respondents resulted in treatment and control groups of almost equal size. On average, respondents 
tend to use the Self-Financing Margin more for assessing their municipal finances than for assessing 
overall performance and quality of service delivery – which is to be expected because the Self-
Financing Margin is an indicator of financial performance. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
ANALYSIS 
Balance and manipulation checks 
Before embarking upon our actual analysis, we need to make sure that our control and treatment 
groups are balanced and we need to execute manipulation checks to identify whether our treatment 
is actually effective (Baekgaard et al., 2015). First, as a balance check, we use an independent t-test to 
identify whether the differences between our control and treatment groups concerning gender, age, 
years of education, party membership and coalition membership are significant. These are not 
significant, implying that our groups are well-balanced and that we do not need to control for these 
individual-level variables (Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015). Second, as a manipulation check we include 
three questions after our vignettes aimed at identifying whether the treatment got through to the 
respondents: (1) My municipality’s Self-Financing Margin is better than the standard set by the Flemish 
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Government. (2) My municipality’s Self-Financing Margin is better than that of its neighboring 
municipalities. (3) My municipality’s Self-Financing Margin is better than the advised norm of the 
Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities. If, for instance, the coercive treatment has indeed 
gotten through to the respondents, we should expect significant impacts on the positive and negative 
versions of the coercive treatments on the first manipulation question compared to the control group. 
Hence, for each treatment we compare the effect of receiving either the positive or negative 
information to receiving the control condition. Table 3 confirms our expectation in the sense that those 
receiving positive information are more likely to respond more positively than the control group 
(significant positive coefficient) and vice versa (significant negative coefficient). We can now move on 
to our actual analyses of H1 – H4. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Coercive, mimetic, normative pressures and performance information use 
All of the analyses are conducted by using random effects modelling with clustered robust standard 
errors at the municipal level to control for the nested  nature of our data (i.e. politicians are nested in 
municipalities). In Table 4, we present the results of testing H1 to H3. As is apparent from the table, 
we find support for H1. Respondents who receive the coercive pressure treatment are more likely to 
indicate performance information use for analyzing municipal finances and overall municipal 
performance. However, they are not more likely to indicate performance information use for analyzing 
the quality of municipal service delivery or to actually give their e-mail to learn more about our 
performance indicator. Interestingly, the mimetic pressure treatment does not seem to matter much 
for any of our performance information use variables thus resulting in a rejection of H2. In contrast, 
there is evidence in support of H3 as the normative pressure treatment stimulates respondents to give 
their e-mail in order to learn more about the performance indicator. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The moderating role of negativity bias 
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We split our treatment groups into two subgroups: those receiving positive versus negative 
performance information – thus effectively resulting in six treatment subgroups – and re-run our 
models. In line with H4, we expect that the treatment groups receiving negative performance 
information react more strongly than those receiving positive performance information (i.e. a bigger 
effect size). The results are presented in Table 5. The analysis provides only weak and inconsistent 
evidence in support of this hypothesis. Negativity bias influences the strength of the coercive pressure 
treatment on performance information use for analyzing municipal finances but, apart from this 
finding, by far the most results are insignificant in this analysis. Interestingly, there is even some 
indication of positivity bias (Ferrara & Yang, 2015) in the case of the coercive pressure treatment as 
respondents receiving the coercive positive treatment are more likely to use the information for 
analyzing their overall municipal performance than those receiving the coercive negative treatment. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we sought to identify the conditions under which politicians purposefully use 
performance information. We employed New Institutional Theory – and specifically institutional 
isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) – as well as negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001) to define 
theory-based hypotheses. A randomized survey experiment based on real information with 1,240 
Flemish local politicians was conducted. Our results led to the conclusion that coercive and normative 
pressures have a part to play in determining politicians’ performance information use, whereas 
mimetic pressures and negativity bias have little impact. These findings have several implications for 
public administration theory and practice. 
 Our paper indicates that institutional isomorphism has impact on purposeful performance 
information use by politicians but only under specific conditions. Specifically, when performance 
information was benchmarked with a coercive pressure, politicians were more likely to use this 
information for analyzing their municipality’s finances as well as overall performance and when 
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performance information was benchmarked with a normative pressure, politicians were more likely to 
fill in their e-mail address to receive more information. These findings seemingly suggest that coercive 
pressures outperform normative and mimetic pressures in their capacity to predict purposeful 
performance information use by politicians. However, we nuance the generalizability of these findings 
due to the specific public management context of Flemish municipalities (O’Toole & Meier, 2015). 
Indeed, Flemish municipalities have recently been required to adopt a Policy and Management Cycle 
in order to increase their financial performance (George et al., 2017). One critical aspect of this cycle 
is that Flemish municipalities need to achieve a financial standard by the end of their policy cycle 
(Goeminne & George, Forthcoming). This standard is set by the Flemish Government and implies a 
Self-Financing Margin of at least 0. If the municipality fails to meet this standard, sanctions and 
penalties will follow. Hence, the coercive pressures within this article have a penalizing mechanism 
tied to them – these are not simply voluntary standards but need to be achieved to avoid financial 
consequences. Such consequences are not tied to the mimetic and normative pressures. Future 
research might assess whether coercive pressures still have an influence when there is no 
accountability system tied to them. Moreover, we operationalized mimetic pressures by looking at the 
average score of neighboring municipalities. Flemish municipalities strongly differ in size – with about 
26% of municipalities having less than 10.000 inhabitants (George et al., 2017). Politicians in bigger 
municipalities that are surrounded by smaller neighbors might not consider these neighbors as 
relevant benchmarks and vice versa. Similarly, our normative pressures were operationalized by one 
specific professional organization – the Flemish Association of Cities and Municipalities. Although this 
organization seems to trigger politicians into asking for more information about their score, it does not 
spark intended purposeful use of performance information. It might be that this organization is not 
really considered a norm setter for politicians and other organizations such as political parties or 
educational institutions might be more relevant. Future research can thus investigate whether our 
findings differ based on another operationalization of mimetic and normative pressures. Conclusively, 
although our findings are related to our specific empirical context, we do add to previous public 
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management research that uncovered the importance of coercive and normative pressures in the 
usage of management tools within the public sector (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2009; Decramer et al., 2012). 
 Our findings suggest that negativity bias is not as all-encompassing a phenomenon as is 
sometimes suggested. Negative performance information did matter more than positive information 
when a coercive benchmark was presented and performance information use centered on analyzing 
the municipality’s finances. In all other scenarios, there was no significant evidence for negativity bias. 
The above-mentioned finding is not surprising taking into account the Flemish context. As mentioned 
earlier, Flemish municipalities are expected to achieve a standard coerced by the Flemish Government 
(i.e. a Self-Financing Margin of at least 0). Scoring below said standard implies a failure to meet this 
requirement, which could result in financial penalties (Goeminne & George, Forthcoming). Because 
the Self-Financing Margin is a financial ratio influenced by the financial decisions of the municipality, 
it makes sense that politicians are more inclined to use this indicator to analyze municipal finances – 
in particular if they fear potential penalties due to bad performance. Hence, negative differentiation 
theory (Rozin & Royzman, 2001) in our study only seemed to have explanatory power for performance 
information use when failure to achieve a coerced financial standard emerged and when performance 
information use centered on analyzing municipal finances. We encourage future studies to replicate 
our findings in different contexts and under different conditions to assess the relevance of negative 
differentiation theory in public administration and policy settings. Conclusively, we identify that 
negativity bias might only matter to performance information use under specific conditions whereas 
its impact on policy and management preferences is seemingly more consistent (e.g. Nielsen & 
Baekgaard, 2015; Nielsen & Moynihan, 2016; George et al., 2017). 
Although we did not expect to find evidence for positivity bias (Ferrara & Yang, 2015), a 
particular finding did support the moderating effect of positive information. Specifically, politicians 
who received information that their municipality scored better than the performance standard set by 
the Flemish Government were more inclined to use this performance information when analyzing the 
overall performance of their municipality. This implies that negativity bias strengthens the impact of 
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coercive pressures when analyzing the municipality’s finances whereas positivity bias strengthens the 
impact of coercive pressures when analyzing the municipality’s overall performance. These findings 
contradict previous research that indicates that blame avoidance is more important than credit 
claiming (e.g. Hood, 2011; Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015; Soroka, 2006). Indeed, it seems that – in our 
case – evidence for both blame avoidance and credit claiming is uncovered but under different 
conditions. We thus encourage future scholars to not disregard positivity bias in their analyses and 
identify the conditions under which positivity bias might be more potent than negativity bias. 
Finally, our findings have implications for policymakers and other public sector practitioners. 
Simply enforcing performance measurement systems upon public organizations does not necessarily 
imply that relevant performance information is produced and used (George & Desmidt, 2018; Taylor, 
2011). We illustrate that thorough scrutiny is necessary when devising ways in which performance 
information will be presented to politicians. Dashboards of performance indicators produced by 
central authorities are increasingly popular in the public sector and are at the heart of many 
performance measurement systems (Edwards & Thomas, 2005). However, to evolve towards 
performance management such dashboards should not simply present performance information in 
the hope that this information will be used (Julnes & Holzer, 2001). Rather, specific nudges to the 
dashboard’s design can help increase the likelihood that performance information will be purposefully 
used by practitioners. Based on our insights we suggest these dashboard include a benchmark with 
performance standards set by central authorities as well as norms advised by professional 
organizations to stimulate purposeful performance information use. 
LIMITATIONS 
Institutional isomorphism is a “middle range theory” in the sense that it allows us to define workable 
hypotheses while simultaneously adding to the “grand theory” of New Institutionalism (Abner et al., 
2017). However, our choice for a survey experiment does imply some limitations in testing a middle 
range theory. First, due to the nature of survey experiments we had to design specific vignettes to 
operationalize the institutional pressures. While we believe this operationalization to be relevant, it 
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does not fully grasp all aspects underlying these pressures. Other findings might be uncovered when 
different choices on how to operationalize these pressures are made. Second, we focus on behavioral 
intentions to purposefully use performance information and a semi-behavioral construct. Whether or 
not these result in actual performance information use behavior by politicians during decision-making 
is unclear. Third, we use a specific performance indicator (i.e. Self-Financing Margin) in a specific 
setting (i.e. Flemish municipalities). Replication of our findings is thus necessary before we can 
generalize to a broader population. Fourth, while our experiment allows us to causally test relations, 
it does not provide insights into the underlying causal mechanisms. 
Future research can address these limitations. Other survey experiments could focus on 
different ways to measure institutional pressures – for instance, coercive pressures can be 
operationalized through informal rules and mandates as opposed to formal regulation, mimetic 
pressures can be operationalized by looking at other similar organizations that might not be 
geographical neighbors and normative pressures can center on the role of educational institutions. 
Similarly, another type of performance information can be used – for instance indicators of citizen 
satisfaction as opposed to financial performance. Other methods could also be applied. Actual 
behavior could be observed by conducting laboratory experiments, observing politicians in their daily 
practices and analyzing formal council reports or meeting minutes. In-depth case studies could uncover 
potential causal mechanisms explaining why politicians react to certain information in a specific 
context. In the end, a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods is the best approach to studying 
performance measurement and management in the public sector. 
CONCLUSION 
We initiated this paper by highlighting the paradox between the popularity of performance 
measurement in public organizations and the seemingly consistent stream of criticism arguing against 
performance measurement’s effectiveness in a public sector context. In this paper, we went beyond 
this paradox by advocating a nuanced perspective where the question is not necessarily “does 
performance measurement work” but rather “under which conditions do politicians purposefully use 
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performance information”. Indeed, performance measurement is a highly politicized theme and too 
often the institutional forces shaping performance information use have been neglected. We 
illustrated that, in part, whether or not politicians purposefully use performance information is 
influenced by the manner in which this information is presented to them. Simply “raining down” 
numbers might not necessarily work, rather one could think about benchmarking performance 
information with performance standards set by a central authority or a norm advised by a reputable 
professional organization in order to spark a reaction from politicians. In conclusion, we encourage 
other scholars to explicitly incorporate politics into performance measurement studies thus identifying 
not only the conditions under which performance information is used by politicians but also how it as 
actually used. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Survey design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introductory question: 
Previous knowledge of 
financial performance
Control
Different information 
on own  self-financing 
margin provided.
T1: Coercive pressure
Different information 
on own  self-financing 
margin provided and 
benchmarked with 
standard set by Flemish 
Government.
T2: Mimetic pressure
Different information 
on own  self-financing 
margin provided and 
benchmarked with the 
average of neighboring 
municipalities.
T3: Normative pressure
Different information 
on own  self-financing 
margin provided and 
benchmarked with the 
advice of the 
Association of Flemish 
Cities and 
Municipalities.
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TABLES 
Table 1: Experimental vignettes 
Control group Treatment group 1 
(Coercive pressure) 
Treatment group 2 
(Mimetic pressure) 
Treatment group 3 
(Normative pressure) 
The financial situation of 
Flemish municipalities is 
high on the agenda of the 
Flemish government. For 
instance, a lot of 
attention is being paid to 
the self-financing margin 
of municipalities. 
 
Based on an analysis of 
recent accounting 
information, the self-
financing margin in 
[Insert municipality 
name] is [insert self-
financing margin]. 
The financial situation of 
Flemish municipalities is 
high on the agenda of the 
Flemish government. For 
instance, a lot of 
attention is being paid to 
the self-financing margin 
of municipalities. 
 
Based on an analysis of 
recent accounting 
information, the self-
financing margin in 
[Insert municipality 
name] is [insert self-
financing margin].  This is 
[worse/better] than the 
standard set by the 
Flemish Government, 
which is a self-financing 
margin of at least € 0. 
The financial situation of 
Flemish municipalities is 
high on the agenda of the 
Flemish government. For 
instance, a lot of 
attention is being paid to 
the self-financing margin 
of municipalities. 
 
Based on an analysis of 
recent accounting 
information, the self-
financing margin in 
[Insert municipality 
name] is [insert self-
financing margin].  This is 
[worse/better] than the 
average score of the 
neighboring 
municipalities, which is a 
self-financing margin of 
[Insert average]. 
The financial situation of 
Flemish municipalities is 
high on the agenda of the 
Flemish government. For 
instance, a lot of 
attention is being paid to 
the self-financing margin 
of municipalities. 
 
Based on an analysis of 
recent accounting 
information, the self-
financing margin in 
[Insert municipality 
name] is [insert self-
financing margin].  This is 
[worse/better] than the 
advised margin of the 
Association of Flemish 
Cities and Municipalities, 
which is a self-financing 
margin of at least € 0. 
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Table 2: Descriptives 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Coercive 
treatment 
0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
1,240 
Mimetic 
treatment 
0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
1,240 
Normative 
treatment 
0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
1,240 
PIU – finance 7.22 2.34 0.00 10.00 1,239 
PIU – 
performance 
6.67 5.57 0.00 10.00 
1,237 
PIU – quality 5.79 2.62 0.00 10.00 1,235 
PIU – mail 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 1,240 
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Table 3: Manipulation checks 
 Coercive pressure Mimetic pressure Normative pressure 
 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Constant 6.109*** 0.134 6.128*** 0.133 6.404*** 0.138 
Positive treatment 1.162*** 0.163 1.452*** 0.218 1.146*** 0.185 
Negative treatment -2.062*** 0.431 -2.236*** 0.210 -2.708*** 0.395 
Wald Chi² 84.30*** 213.68*** 110.70*** 
N 600 600 604 
Note: Random effects model with a continuous outcome variable (running from 0-10) and clustered robust 
standard errors at the municipal level. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 4: Effect of coercive, mimetic and normative pressure treatments on PIU 
 PIU – finance1 PIU – performance1 PIU – quality1 PIU – mail2 
 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Constant 7.079*** 0.191 6.546*** 0.125 5.709*** 0.150 -0.881*** 0.132 
Coercive 
treatment 
0.417* 0.191 0.337+ 0.179 0.311 0.201 0.146 0.177 
Mimetic 
treatment 
-0.013 0.181 -0.069 0.179 -0.181 0.215 0.220 0.174 
Normative 
treatment 
0.141 0.175 0.243 0.176 0.202 0.202 0.321+ 0.181 
Wald Chi² 6.02 6.25 7.70+ 3.42 
N 1,239 1,237 1,235 1,240 
1 Random effects model with a continuous outcome variable. 
2 Logistic random effects model with a dichotomous outcome variable. 
Clustered robust standard errors (municipal level) in all specifications. 
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
 
Table 5: Effect of positive versus negative treatments on PIU 
 PIU – finance1 PIU – performance1 PIU – quality1 PIU – mail2 
 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Constant 7.083*** 0.132 6.554*** 0.126 5.719*** 0.151 -0.884*** 0.131 
Coercive 
positive 
treatment 
0.369+ 0.200 0.341+ 0.185 0.299 0.213 0.135 0.184 
Coercive 
negative 
treatment 
0.717+ 0.430 0.246 0.414 0.306 0.446 0.231 0.300 
Mimetic 
positive 
treatment 
-0.061 0.208 -0.141 0.199 -0.171 0.248 0.297 0.192 
Mimetic 
negative 
treatment 
0.042 0.256 -0.004 0.258 -0.251 0.284 0.130 0.237 
Normative 
positive 
treatment 
0.065 0.186 0.563 0.419 0.163 0.436 0.527 0.359 
Normative 
negative 
treatment 
0.147 0.178 0.195 0.180 0.195 0.212 0.301 0.189 
Wald Chi² 6.89 7.74 8.11 4.80 
N 1,239 1,237 1,235 1,240 
1 Random effects model with a continuous outcome variable. 
2 Logistic random effects model with a dichotomous outcome variable. 
Clustered robust standard errors (municipal level) in all specifications. 
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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